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Abstract
This Chapter addresses the extremes of private ordering, and the extent to
which the principal multilateral copyright instruments, the Berne Convention1 and
the TRIPs Accord,2 limit the range of State responses to the problems encountered
at the far ends of the copyright-contract spectrum. At one end, we encounter
private ordering at its most aggressive, in which private parties enter into
agreements (or, more likely, the stronger party coerces the weaker parties, who
may be mass market consumers) to protect subject matter or rights excluded from
the ambit of copyright’s exclusivity. At the other end, the difficulties arise not from
overweening sellers forcing their way with timid buyers, but from failure to find the
seller at all. The buyers, would-be copyright exploiters, are unable to locate the
right holders from whom to negotiate a license to use their works. In this case, no
contract can be concluded, unless the State steps in for the absent right holder. In
the first case, a contract has been concluded, but at a cost that the State could not
exact were it to seek the same result through public ordering.
The analysis of Part I proceeds in three steps. First, a review of the
relevant Berne-TRIPs provisions will identify and assess the “maxima.” Second,
consideration will be given to whether the prescriptive force of the maxima extends
to extra-copyright means of achieving copyright-prohibited objectives. Finally, an
inquiry will be made into whether the mandatory exclusions and restrictions apply
only to foreign Berne Union works or whether the treaties can also be read to
compel their domestic application. Part II shifts from private ordering to Stateimposed licenses and other interventions that limit the exercise of exclusive rights.
Where Part I inquires whether current multilateral instruments limit private
parties’ freedom effectively to expand the scope of copyright subject matter or
rights, Part II examines whether those same instruments constrain State responses
*
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to systemic failures of private ordering by limiting the remedies available against
the unauthorized exercise of otherwise exclusive rights. The example of failed
private ordering that will be considered concerns the problem of “orphan works,”
where the inability to find right holders means that would-be exploiters cannot
enter into private agreements with them.
This exploration of the extremes of the copyright-contract spectrum finds
little prescriptive force in the Berne-TRIPs “maxima” with respect to private
agreements to protect subject matter the treaties exclude from copyright’s ambit.
By contrast, Berne-TRIPs “minima” can meaningfully constrain a State’s
prerogative to impose compulsory licenses or limit remedies when private
agreements cannot be concluded, for example because a willing buyer cannot find
the seller (willing or otherwise). The minima should not, however, be regarded as
an impediment to resolving the “orphan works” problem. Rather, attention to the
minima should enable States to shape an orphan works regime which both permits
the exploitation of unlocatable right holders’ works, and fairly compensates those
right holders who, notwithstanding a rigorously diligent but unsuccessful search,
subsequently turn up and object to the uses made of their works.

Introduction
This Chapter addresses the extremes of p rivate ordering, an d the extent to w hich the
principal multilateral copyright i nstruments, the Berne Co nvention3 and the TRIPs Accord, 4
limit the range of State responses to the problems encountered at the far ends of the copyrightcontract spectrum. At one end, we encounter private ordering at its most aggressive, in which
private p arties enter into agreements (or, more likely, the stronger party coerces the weaker
parties, who may be mass market consumers) to protect subject matter or rights excluded from
the a mbit o f c opyright’s exclusivity. At the other end, the diffic ulties arise no t fro m
overweening sellers forcing their way with timid buyers, but from failure to find the seller at
all. The bu yers, would-be c opyright exp loiters, are unab le to locate the right holders fro m
whom to negotiate a license to use their works. In t his case, no contr act can be concluded,
unless th e Sta te steps in for the a bsent righ t ho lder. In the first cas e, a contract h as been
concluded, but at a cost that the State cou ld not exact were it to seek the same result through
public ordering.
With respect to public and private ordering, the 2001 European Union [EU ]copyright
directive5 im plements internati onal ob ligations im posed b y the 1996 WIPO (World
Intellectual Propert y Organization) Cop yright Treaties.6 Member S tates must, on the on e
hand, incorporate new (or rei nforced) protections for the right of making works available to
the publi c, notably over digital networks, a nd for technolog ical measures protecting
copyrighted works. 7 On the oth er hand, M ember States must als o ensure th at exceptions to
3
Berne Convention for t he Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1986, as re vised at Paris on Ju ly
24, 1971, and amended on Sept. 28, 1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
4
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments--Results of the Uruguay Round vol.
31, art. 13, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
5
DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 22 May 2001
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJEC [Official
Journal of the European Communities], L 167/10 (22.6.2001) [hereafter “Information Society Directive”].
6
Worl d In tellectual P roperty Organization C opyright Tre aty, D ec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L. M. 65 ; World Intellectual
Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76.
7
WCT [WIPO Copyright Treaty] arts. 8, 11, 12 WPPT [WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty], arts 10, 14,
18, 19
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copyright remain available in the digital environment.8 Article 6.4 of th e Directive is by now
a notorious monument to the incoherence that can result from endeavouring to reconcile these
objectives.9 The Directive retrie ves a kind of coherence in article 6.4, clause 4, however, by
abandoning all pretence to balancing enh anced rights un der copyright against exceptions.
Clause 4 allows that all bets are off when th e work is made available on demand over digital
networks. At that point, the contractual terms of delivery of the work prevail.10
Shall we th erefore inf er that in th e EU, at lea st for digit al on-dem and deli veries, no
copyright n orms r estrain th e pr erogatives a copyright holder may allo cate to itsel f by
contract?11 As for t he United States [U.S .], while no p rovision of the copy right act
incorporates a n equ ivalent d efection to private orderi ng, the qu estion whether a copyright
owner may “contract out of” limitations on copyright is hotly debated.12
I do not propose he re to revisit the U .S. deba te, nor to e nter into t he E uropean law
fray. Rather, Part I of this Chap ter considers whether international copyright norms, imposed
by or derived from t he Berne Co nvention an d the TRIPs Accord, effect supranati onal
limitations on the extent to which member States may permit copyright owners to contract out
of c opyright l imitations. The Berne-TRIPs minima of protection ar e well-known : member
States must accord e ach oth ers’ autho rs c ertain ex clusive rights i n original works of
authorship.13 What may be less familiar are the Berne/TRIPs maxima: mandatory exclusions
from or limitations on the scope of protection. For example, TRIPs article 9(2) prohibits the
protection of ideas, procedures and methods of operation, and Be rne article 10(1) in cludes a
mandatory quotation privilege. Is it possible to const rue from th e Ber ne-TRIPs maxima a
precept b arring not only a member Sta te’s ex tension of cop yright protecti on, bu t also th e
resort to contract law to escape limitations on copyright subject matter or scope?
The analysis of this Part proceeds in three steps. First, a review of the relevant BerneTRIPs provisions will identify and assess the “maxima.” Second, consideration will be given
to whether the prescriptive force of the maxima extends to extra-copyright means of achieving
copyright-prohibited objectives. Finally, an inquiry will be made into whether the mandatory
exclusions and restrictio ns apply only to foreign Berne Unio n works or whether the treaties
can also be read to compel their domestic application.
Part II shifts from private ordering to State-imposed l icenses and o ther interventions
that limit the exercise of exclusive rights. Wh ere Part I inquires whether current multilateral
instruments limit private parties’ freedom effectively to expand the scope of copyright subject
matter or rights, Part II examines whether those same instruments constrain State responses to
8

Agreed Statement to WCT art 10.
See Alvise Ma ria Case llati, The Ev olution of A rticle 6. 4 of t he European In formation Society Copyright
Directive, 2 4 C olum. J.L. & A rts 369, 393-400 (20 01); P aul G anley, D igital Copyright an d the N ew Cret ive
Dynamics, 12 Int’l J.L. & Info. Tech. 282, 327-330 (2004).
10
Information Society Directive, article 6.4.4 “The provisions of the first and se cond subparagraphs shall not
apply to works or other su bject-matter made available to the public on agreed contractual terms in such a way
that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them..”
11
S ee general ly, L. Guibault , G. Westk amp, T. Rieber- Mohn, P. B. Hugenholt z, et al , STUDY ON TH E
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECT IN MEMBER STATES” LAWS OF DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC ON THE HARMONISATION
OF CERTAIN ASPECTS O F COPYRIGHT AN D RELATED RIGHTS IN T HE INFORMATION SOCIETY, re port to the
European Commission, DG Internal Market, February 2007, chapter 5.
12
See ProCD, Inc. v. Ze idenberg, 86 F .3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (offering support for contractual alternatives to
copyright law). But see Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 Md. L. Re v. 616 (2 008)
(proposing a m odel for co pyright pre emption of contracts ba sed on waiver d octrine); V iva Moffat, SuperCopyright: Contracts, P reemption, an d t he S tructure of Cop yright P olicymaking, 4 1 U .C. D avis L. Rev. 4 5
(2007) (arguing that copyrght law can preempt contract provisions).
13
See, e.g., Berne Conv. arts. 5-20.
9
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systemic failures of p rivate ord ering by limiting t he r emedies available against the
unauthorized exercise of otherwise exclusive rights. The ex ample of failed private ordering
that will be considered concerns th e problem of “orphan works,” where the inability to find
right holders means that would-be exploiters cannot enter into private agreements with them.

I. Limitations or restrictions on protection under TRIPs and the Berne
Convention: Is there a principle of “maximum protection”?
In t he sa me way that t he Berne Convention enun ciates a principle of minimum
protection in favor of Union authors, so (it can be argued) is there a corresponding principle
of maximum protection to be i mplied i n those few cases wh ere the Co nvention limits or
excludes pro tection. It can be arg ued th at an exclusion or li mitation of p rotection is to be
treated as an i mperative provision of the Conv ention, hav ing the p urpose of protecting th e
interests of the pub lic, rath er th an t hose of the author. In such a case, one cou ld argue tha t
national legislation cannot provide protection in a case where the Convention has specifically
prohibited coverage of the excluded subject matter or rights.
The Berne Convention permits member States to choose to limit the scope of certain
exclusive rights, and may provide a framework to which the national exclusion must conform,
but ther e ar e only t wo clear im perative restrict ions of signifi cance und er the present tex t.
These are the exclusion of “news of the day” and “miscellaneous facts having the character of
mere items of press i nformation” under article 2(8); and th e requirement under article 10(1)
that the making of quotations shall be per mitted (under the conditions posed in that artic le).
TRIPs a rticle 9(2), after bind ing its adh erents t o comply with the Be rne Co nvention
(presumably, including its li mitations), admonishes that copyright protection shall not extend
to “ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.”
A des ire to maintain the f ree international fl ow of basic ele ments o f information
appears to animate and unite these ex ceptions. Thes e provis ions rev eal the in ternational
treaties’ solicitude for the bro ader public interest, notwithstanding the ir ov erall goa l of
protecting the rights of authors and copyright owners. The Berne Convention does not purport
to prevent a member State from locally privatizing infor mation its own authors generate; on
the contrary, Berne article 5(3) reserves “protection in the coun try of origin” to governance
by “domestic law.” But Berne can require that member States preserve the freedom of these
excluded elements w hen the works that contain them traverse borders . Thu s, nat ional
legislation purporting t o grant protection in such cases to authors fro m other Be rne Union
countries would be contrary to the Convention (even though the Convention does not prevent
member States from protecting domestic authors’ information.
A. Berne-TRIPS “Maxima”
1. Mandatory subject matter exclusions: Ideas and facts
a. Exclusion of ideas: Berne Convention article 2(1); TRIPs article 9(2)
Article 2(1) of the Berne Conven tion sets out the subject matter, the protection which
the treaty requires:

4

The expression “literary and artistic w orks” shal l in clude every production in
the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of
its expression . . .
Although the language is capacious, the term “expression” implies that the protection offered
by the Co nvention to literary and artistic w orks does not extend to the i deas embodied in
those works, but on ly to the mode or for m in w hich those ideas are expressed. 14 This
principle is made explicit in A rticle 9 o f t he TRIP s Accord, tit led “Relation to t he Bern e
Convention,” and whose second paragraph states:
(2) Copyright shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods
of operation or mathematical concepts as such.
The TRIPs article 9(2) text represents a generalization from earlier drafts of what became the
TRIPs article 10(1) specification of the inclusion of computer programs within the mandatory
subject m atter of copyright.15 The drafters elevated the li mitation on th e protectab ility o f
computer progra ms to an all-en compassing i nterpretation of copyrightable subject matter
within the meaning of the Berne Convention. Structurally, article 9(2) must be understood as
clarifying, rat her th an r educing, th e scope of cop yright subject matter under Berne : TRIPs
incorporates article 20 o f the Berne Convention, which p rohibits Berne member States from
making agreements “contrary to” Berne minima.16
b. Berne Convention article 2(8): news of the day and miscellaneous facts
Article 2(8) of the Bern e Conv ention contains an e xclusion to th e protection offered
by the Convention:
The protect ion of this Convention shall not a pply to news of the da y o r t o
miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information.
The w ording of article 2(8) makes it d ifficult to discern its purpose, and thus. the
interpretation to be given to the terms “news of the day” and “miscellaneous. information ...”
Does a rticle 2(8) em body a juridical conception of the nat ure of authors’ rights which
excludes th ese items fro m protection on the b asis th at they are incapable of constituting
literary or a rtistic works? If so, i t could then be s aid t hat su ch an exclus.ion is strictly
unnecessary as these items are not, in any event, covered by the Convention, because they fall
within the category of facts and items of information which cannot be the subject of copyright
protection. But if t hese elements already fall outside the scope of copy right, then t wo
conflicting conclusions arise. E ither article 2(8) adds noth ing to th e treaty obligations and is
simply em pty rhetoric, or the prov ision i s no t in fac t redu ndant becau se th e specification
makes clear th at, un like o ther subject matter outside th e scope of ar ticle 2, such as sound
recordings, member States do not enjoy an opti on to protect th is subject matter (at least not
respecting works from other Union countries).
14

S ee, e .g., Sam Ricketson a nd Jane C. G insburg, I NTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT A ND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS:
THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND (2006) [hereafter Ricketson & Ginsburg], ¶ 8.07.
15
S ee Daniel G ervais, T HE TRIPS AGREEMENT DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2 008) [h ereafter
Gervais], 221-22. The relevant texts of the prior drafts of art. 10(1) are set out at in id. at 223-24.
16
S ee Gervais at 2 21; Silke von Lew inski, Inte rnational Copyright La w and P olicy ¶ 10.58 ( 2008). Ber ne
Article 20 states in relevant part: “The Governments of the countries of the Union reserve the right to enter into
special agreements among themselves, in so far as such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than
those granted by the Convention, or contain other provisions not contrary to this Convention.”
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Article 2(8)’s incl usion in the Convention could then be understood on two grounds.
First, as the basic principle is not expressly stated elsewhere in th e Convention, its inclusion
in article 2(8) provides a useful confirmation that the principle of the non protection of facts is
generally applicable under the Convention. Second, if a member country of the Union does,
in fact, accord copyright protection to bare it ems of news and press information, the authors
of such item s have n o ri ght to claim equivalent protectio n under the Conv ention in o ther
Union countries. Unlike the other paragraphs of article 2 which establish the bare minimum of
what each country must protect as literary or artistic works, article 2(8) provides a ceiling.
On the other hand, article 2(8) excludes only protection under “this Convention,” thus
leaving open t he qu estion whethe r member Stat es may accord protection t o foreig n a uthors
under other headings -- for example, their laws of unfair competition, or ev en their copyright
laws.17 However, because the Berne Convention excludes this subject matter, its obligation of
national treatment does not apply. As a result, a Union country which accords such protection
to its own authors would be under no obligation to extend this coverage to authors from other
Union countri es. But if public policy u nderpins the basic princip le t hat copy right protects
only the form in which works are expresse d, and thus i mplies an intent in the Convention to
leave ideas, facts, and information in the public domain for all to use, then allowing member
States to protect foreign authors under their own private international law rules regarding the
treatment of foreigners (as opposed to the treaty obligation of national treatment) would seem
in tension with the international public domain objective.
The draftin g hi story o f t he current text of the Berne Convention supports the
conclusion that th e Convention excludes pr otection for fa cts, although it does not
unambiguously prec lude m ember States from p rotecting on some oth er basis i nformation
gathered by foreign a uthors. In the preparations which were und ertaken for the Stockholm
Conference by the Swedish Government and BIRPI (the United International Bureaux for the
Protection of In tellectual Property) 18 the 1963 Study Group observed that while article 2(8)
could b e viewed as superfluous fro m a s ystematic p erspective, it had formed p art of th e
Convention for a long time and was “a good exp ression of a principle from which legislation
and jurisprudence ... [could] ta ke their lead, as well as a re minder of the freedom of
information”.19 It w as useful because it recogn ized the “ practical importance of fixing ... the
line of d emarcation between co pyright and other means of protecti on”.20 The Group
recommended the retention of the article without any change, but with some discussion of its
interpretation in th e do cuments of the Conference.21 In kee ping with this proposal, th e
following in terpretation of article 9( 3) (which wa s to b ecome article 2(8 ) i n th e Stockholm
Act) was proposed in the program for the S tockholm Conference,22 and was adopted in turn
by Main Committee I in its report to the Conference:
... the Convention does not protect mere items of information on n ews of th e
day or m iscellaneous fa cts, because such material do es not posse ss th e
attributes needed to con stitute a w ork. That implies a fortiori that news items
or the fa cts themselves are no t protected. Th e articles of journalists or other
“journalistic” works reporting n ews items are, on the other hand, protected to
17

See infra, Part I.B.
See Records of t he Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm (1967), Vol I, WIPO, 1971, 7 1 [hereafter,
Records 1967], vol. I, 115.
19
Iid.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. At 115–18.
18
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the extent that they are li terary or artistic wor ks. It did n ot seem essential to
clarify the text of the Convention on this point.23
2. Mandatory limitation on exclusive rights: the article 10(1) quotation right
Article 10(1) is the Berne exception that comes closest to embodying a “user right” to
make q uotations (“it sh all be pe rmissible t o make quo tations …”), in contrast to th e
Convention’s ot her e xceptions which a re couched more in the langu age of privileges or
allowable concessions t o users to be determined by na tional leg islation. A rticle 1 0(1)
exceptions are matters that must rather than may appear in national laws.
Article 10(1) contains n o limitation on the kind s of work t hat may be q uoted. On e
may ther efore conc lude that th e ful l range of “ literary and artistic w orks” is s ubject to th e
quotation righ t. Si milarly, t he text does no t confine th e medium or means of making the
quotation. There is nothing in the wording of article 10(1) to indicate that this ex ception is
concerned only with reproduction rights: quotations may be made just as easily in the course
of a lecture, performance, or broadcast or other transmission, as in a material form such as a
book, article, musical, audiovisual or visual work of art.
The text sets out three conditions to be satisfied before a quotation must be permitted.
First, the work in que stion must have been “l awfully made av ailable to t he public” . This is
wider th an the concept of a “published w ork” under art icle 3(3) where such act s a s
broadcasting and public performance are excluded from the scope of “publication,” and where
it is required that the work be published “with the consent of the author.” The requirement of
“lawful av ailability” und er arti cle 10(1) inclu des the making av ailable o f works by any
means, not simply by publication of copies of the work. Thus, if a dramatic or musical work is
performed in public or broadcast, article 10(1) would permit the making of quotations from it
by a critic or reviewer who takes down passages verbatim for use in his review. It should also
be noted that “lawful availability” under ar ticle 10(1) covers th e situation where availability
has occurred subject to a compulsory license; in this case, however, the license must conform
to th e conditions i mposed b y other pro visions of the Co nvention, n otably articles 1 1bis
(retransmissions) and 13 (sound recordings).
Second, th e making of t he quotat ion must be “ compatible with fair pract ice.” The
Stockholm study program indicated that “the u se in question can on ly be accepted aft er an
objective ap preciation.”24 Length is certainly a matter w hich is rel evant to th e question of
“fair pra ctice,” as is th e pur pose o f th e quo tation. “Fair pra ctice” is a concept that is more
familiar to Anglo-American l awyers than th eir contin ental European counterparts,25 and
whether as use is “fair” s eems essentially a quest ion for national tribunals to d etermine in
each particular instance. However, the criteria referred to in article 9(2) – conferring general
authority on member States to establish exceptions to the r eproduction right -- would appear
to be equally applicable here i n d etermining whether a p articular quotation is “fair”: does it
conflict with a nor mal exploitation of t he w ork and unreasonably prej udice t he legitimate
interests of the author?26 There is no mention in article 10(1) of the possibility of uses taking
place pursuant to a co mpulsory license, but, in pr inciple, where a us e by way of quotation is
remunerated and “does not ex ceed that just ified by t he purpose,” this s hould more readily
satisfy the requirement of compatibility with fair practice than would a free use.
23

Id, vol II, 1155.
Records 1967, 117.
25
W. No rdemann, K. Vi nck, P. W . Her tin, an d G. Mey er, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AN D NEIGHBOURING
RIGHTS LAW (1990) [hereafter, Nordemann et al (1990)] at 83.
26
See also id. at 83–4.
24
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The third condition is th at the extent of the quotati on must “not exceed that jus.tified
by the purpose.” Quotations for “scientific, critical, informatory or educational purposes” are
within the scope of article 10(1). 27 Other examples are quotations that are made in historical
and oth er scholarl y writ ing by way o f il lus.tration or ev idence for a particu lar view or
argument, and quotations for judicial, pol itical, and en tertainment purposes.28 Finally ,
quotation f or “a rtistic effect” su pplies ano ther exa mple.29 This means no t on ly the
reproduction of “artistic works” or parts of such works for the purposes of illustrating a text or
to provid e the b asis for discussion, as in th e case of a boo k on arti stic styles,30 but a lso th e
quotation of works in g eneral for “arti stic e ffect” as in so me modern works of fiction or
poetry.31
Article 10(1) makes reference to a specific kind of quotation, namely “quotations from
newspaper article s and p eriodicals in th e form of press su mmaries,” which may se em
mystifying to English-speakers. While a “summary” of a newspaper or periodical article may
include a quotation from that article, the making of the summary is not the same thing as the
making of a quotation, and need no t in fact include any direct quotations. In the French text,
however, th e purpose and utili ty of si ngling ou t this ty pe o f quota tion beco me clear. The
French express ion “revue de presse” does not readily translate into “press su mmaries” in
English. A “revue de presse” is not really a s ummary of an article appearing in a newspaper;
rather, it is a collection of quotations fro m a range of newspapers and p eriodicals, all
concerning a single topic, with the purpose of illustrating how different publications report on,
or express opinions about, the same issue.32 Thus, th e genre of “revue de presse” necessarily
includes quotations, but there is no ready English language equivalent to this.
Although a rticle 10(1) does not define “quotat ion,” th is usuall y means the tak ing of
some part of a greater whole—a group of words from a text or a speech, a musical passage or
visual i mage tak en from a piece of music or a work of art—w here the tak ing i s done by
someone o ther th an th e origin ator o f the work.33 Because article 10(1) d oes not explicitly
confine t he exten t of the ta king, se veral d elegations at the Stockho lm Conference were
gravely c oncerned about t he qu estion of le ngth and th erefore favored the retention of the
qualifying adje ctive “short” b efore the w ord “quo tations”.34 In this sphe re, however,
quantitative restrictions are notoriously difficult to apply, and thus are left to be determined in
each case, subject to the general criteria of purpose and fair pract ice.35 In so me instances, it
may be both consistent with the purpose for which the quotation is made and compatible with
fair practice t o make lengt hy quotations fro m a work in order to e nsure that it is presen ted
correctly, as in the ca se of a critical review or work of scholarship. In other circumstances,
dictionary d efinition notwit hstanding, quotati on of the whole work may be j ustifiable, as in
the example given by one commentary of a work on the history of twentieth-century art where
27

Records 1967, 116–17 (Document S/1), 860–1 (minutes).
Id. 117.
29
Id. 861 (comments by Swedish delegate, Mr Hesser).
30
Id. See also Nordemann et al (1990), 83.
31
Records 1967, 861 (Hesser).
32
See, e.g., F rance, CP I arti cle L- 122-5(3)(b) (“ revue de presse” exc eption); Cour t of Ca ssation, Criminal
chamber, decision of 30 January 1978, RIDA Jan. 1980 p. 146, 1979 Rev. Trim. Dr. Com . 456 obs. Françon (a
“revue de pr esse” ne cessarily su pposes a c omparative presentation o f di verse commentaries orig inating from
different journalists and concerning the same theme or event).
33
See here the first meaning given in the definition in the CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY, 10th ed (2001), 1176.
34
Records 1967, 860–1 (Switzerland, France, Hungary, Italy; cf the approach of the FRG and UK). In particular,
note the Swiss proposal for the reintroduction of the adjective “short” and the substitution of the words “justified
by the purpose” by the w ords “that they serve as explanation, reference or i llustration in the context in which
they occur”: Document S/68 at Records 1967, 690. See also Document S/45 (France) at id, 688.
35
Records 1967, 1147 (report).
28

8

representative pictures of particular schools of art wo uld be needed by way of il lustration.36
Another instan ce might be ca rtoons or short poe ms quoted withi n a wider work of
commentary or review.
Finally, while the B erne Convention art icle 10 (1) quo tation rig ht is a mandatory
exception, it also includes a mandatory condition. Paragraph (3) of article 10 provides that:
(3) Where use is made of works in accordance with the opening paragraphs of
this Article, mention shall be made of the source, and of the name of the author
if it appears thereon.
While mandatory mention of the author’s nam e may seem superfluous in the light of
the article 6bis right of attribu tion, the drafters of th e 19 48 Brussels revision in w hich th is
provision was int roduced determined to remove any doubt that the right of attribution was to
be respected in the case of quotations and utilizations made under article 10(1).37 In fact, it is
not c lear th at the arti cle 6 bis moral right s ot herwise applied to law ful quotati ons, and the
records of the 1928 Rome revision conference, at which article 6 bis was introduced, indicate
considerable disinclination to r ecognize the integrity right in the context of article 10 lawful
uses.38 If lawful quotati ons oth erwise fell outside the control of arti cle 6 bis, the 1948
Conference delegates nonetheless agreed that the author’s name should be recognized. Article
6bis having been sidelined, they therefore esta blished an independent basis for the att ribution
right.
It is significant that the article 10(3) mandatory condition enjoys an independent basis,
and does no t s imply s erve to re mind member States that th e b eneficiaries of the quotation
exception must a lso comply with articl e 6 bis. If a rticle 6 bis furnis hed t he basis for the
condition, then th e con dition might not, as a pr actical matter, be truly mandatory because it
would not be in ternationally enforceable th rough World Tra de Org anization [WTO ] dispute
proceedings. TRIPs requires member S tates to “comply” with articles 1 to 21 of t he Berne
Convention, bu t the enforceable “obligations” TRIPs creates exp licitly exclude Bern e
Convention article 6 bis and “the rights deriv ed therefrom.”39 While the arti cle 10(3)
attribution right is of the same kind as those protected by 6 bis, this is not enough to make the
condition unenforceable under TRIPs. The text of article 9 of the TRIPs Agreement does not
say “of the same kind”; it says “derived therefrom.” In that respect, the final text seems more
narrow than t he two earlier dr afts of article 9, which both included b racketed languag e
limiting TRIPs-e nforceable rights to the“
economic right s” protected by th e Ber ne
40
Convention. If “ derived fro m” i mplies “d ependent on, ” th en the history of art icle 10(3)
suggests that the distinct basis for its right of attribution justifies its preservation in the Berne
Convention articles that the TRIPs Agreement makes enforceable.
B. Contracting into more-than-maximal protection?
If the Berne /TRIPs maxima at least preclude member States from protecting the facts
and ideas contained each others’ works of authorship, and also require member States to allow
36

Nordemann et al (1990)at 83.
D ocuments d e l a Conférence r éunie à Bruxelles d u 5 a u 26 juin 1948 ( 1951), 245 (comments i n the
programme). See also preliminary proposals for the postponed Conference of 1935: [1933] Droit d’Auteur 99.
38
Actes 1928, 252–3 (delegations of Switzerland, Japan, Belgium, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Egypt argued
that there was frequently a need to make alterations when making such borrowings).
39
TRIPs, article 9(1).
40
S ee ‘Cha irman’s Re port t o t he G roup on N egotiation on Goo ds’; B russels Dr aft, Document MTN,
TNC/W/35/Rev.1 (3 Dec 1990). The relevant text of both drafts is reproduced in Gervais at 212-13.
37
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quotations to be made f rom each o thers’ works (under the conditi ons established in article
10), do t hese lim itations on copyright law ex tend to prohibiting member Stat es from using
some law other than copyright to achieve the same results? In particular, may a member State
substitute private ordering for pu blic la w, a nd enforce c ontracts protecting Union a uthors’
ideas and information, or prohibiting the making of quotations from Union authors’ works?
Comparison with ano ther kind of parallel reg ime, the protecti on mandated by the
WIPO Co pyright Treaty fo r tec hnological protection measures, might help illuminate th e
analysis. For example, i s it p ossible to recon cile the article 10 (1) mandatory right to make
quotations f rom works that h ave b een “lawfully made available,” w ith the WCT article 11
obligation to protect ag ainst th e circumvention of technological protection measures? Under
article 1(4) of the WCT , contracting States are obliged to adopt the quotation exception (and
all other Berne nor ms), wh ether or not th ey are B erne members. But anti-circumvention
measures may compromise this exception, where the effect of such measures is either to deny
users access to protected works for the purpose of making quotations or to prevent them from
making the necessary reproduction or dissemination of the quotation. Is it th erefore necessary
for nation al laws to all ow such an exception to any anti-circumvention measures that they
adopt?
The answer to t his question must tur n upon the m eaning and scope of the words “a
work which has a lready been lawfully m ade available” i n article 10(1). The form ulation
reflects th e pre-digital era w hen wo rks were made available onl y i n h ard-copy fo rmats t o
users who could the n access and use them without the copyright owner being able to impose
any physical or technica l limitations upon what th e user could do. If anything, at th at stage,
the balance ran in f avor of the user, although provisions such as article 10(1) did place legal
limitations upon what he or she could do. In the digital environment, however, the balance is
potentially shifted sharply in favor of the copyright owner if t he latter first applies effectiv e
technological measures to deny all access except on conditions that the owner specifies. The
words “lawfully made available” in article 10(1) pose a problem here: a work made available
in a d igitally pro tected f ormat is j ust as much l awfully made available as a work in a
traditional hard-copy format, even though the owner is able in t he former case can impose a
veto on what users and other third parties may do with the digital version.
These cons iderations lead to th e conclus ion th at th e oblig ation in a rticle 11 of the
WCT to provide for anti-circumvention protection is subject to the qualification that the latter
should not abridge the exercise of r ights of quotation under article 10(1) of Berne. If a work
has already been made available in h ard-copy analog form, it will be possible for such rights
to be exercised, even it cannot be done in relation to a digital version protected by an effective
technological protection measure. On the oth er hand, if a work is available only in a digital
protected for mat, wit h no provision for the making of quotat ions o ther than on th e ter ms
specified by th e right h older, might th e effect of this b e to deny the e xception und er article
10(1) altogether? If this were so, it would have far-reaching consequences as more and more
works becom e available only in digital protected for mats. F urther reflection, however,
suggests that such terms of access might cause third p arty users inconvenience but not deny
them th e b enefit of th e exception under ar ticle 10(1) alt ogether, in that, even if it is no t
possible to make ready digital cuts from the work, it is still usually possible to make manual
transcriptions from d igital versions or to copy on fi lm or with photog raphic im ages. While
allowances for digital quotation might well be desirable (and desired by users), there would be
no breach of article 10(1) so long as the making of quotations through these more “traditional
means” remains pragmatically possible.
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Thus, it w ould app ear that “para-copyright” pr otection for tec hnological measures41
whose pra ctical effect lim its the ex ercise of the article 10 (1) quota tion ri ght may su bsist
alongside a copyright regime that implements article 10(1), at least so long as the facts on the
ground fall well short of genuine “digital lock up.” Applying this analysis to the question of
contracting out of th e q uotation rig ht (or b y the same token, con tracting into fact and idea
protection), one might conclude that arms-length ne gotiated con tracts p ose no prob lem, bu t
we may need to b e wary of mass-market shri nk-wrap or cl ick-wrap contr acts exceeding
Berne-TRIPs maxima. The potential ge neralization of thes e kinds of contracts effaces
practical distinctions b etween con tractual obligations and copy right rights. S hould th e
alternative u niverse these kinds of contracts establ ish co me to supp lant copy right, then the
mandatory nature of th e Berne-TRIP s maxima may require member States to d ecline to
enforce these contracts, at least where foreign authors are concerned.
C. Internal Effect of Berne-TRIPs Maxima
The demonstration so far has showed only that Berne -TRIPs member States may be
obliged not to enforce contracts which w ould prot ect foreig n U nion authors fro m domestic
exploitation of the facts or ideas contained in their works, or which would prohibit local users
from ex ercising the Berne a rticle 10(1) quotat ion r ight (condition ed b y the art icle 10(3)
attribution obligation) with re spect to foreign works. It is no t y et es tablished that member
States may not enforce contr acts protecting t heir own authors’ i deas and facts, or denying
local us ers’ quotation rights in lo cal works. Bern e article 5(3), wh ich sp ecifies t hat
“protection in th e country of origin is govern ed b y d omestic law,” makes esta blishing th e
latter claim a doubtful prospect.
Although neither treaty prescribes the level of protection a member State must afford
authors whose works were first published in that State, most countries, wary of treating their
own authors w orse than fo reign authors, end up incorporating th e internation al norms in to
domestic legisla tion. But i n this case, t he confinement o f Berne -TRIPs no rms to foreign
authors works to the apparent benefit of local authors. It suffices for international compliance
for a member State to decline to protect a foreign author’s “ideas,” leaving the State free to
protect the ideas of its o wn authors. Although it would constitute discrimination in favor of
its own authors, it is not clear that the favoritism would violate the treaties. This could in turn
mean th at a member State wou ld b e obliged not to enforc e a contra ct conferring ex cessive
protection (that i s, protection i n excess of a nd inconsistent with the “maxima”) on a foreign
author’s work (whatever the law otherwise applicable to the contract), but would encounter no
such constraints with respect to enforcement of contract rights in a local author’s work.42
To give th e Be rne-TRIPs maxima domestic force requ ires creative interpretation of
the pr inciple of n ational treatment. If national treatment e mbodies a non-discrim ination
principle, th en member States s hould not accord less prot ection to foreign authors than t o
locals. The usual remedy for the imbalance, as provided in Berne Conv. article 19, is to allow
the foreign author to claim the grea ter local p rotection. Where the Conv ention bars the
foreign author fro m receiv ing th at protection, however, p erhaps th e r emedy sh ould lie in
41

F or the phrase “ para-copyright,” see , e .g., D avid N immer, A Riff o n Fair U se in the D igital Millennium
Copyright Act, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673, 686 n. 66 (2000).
42
In addition, article 5(3) may mean that a foreign author is entitled, for example, to quote from a local work,
even though a local author would not be so entitled.
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disallowing that cover age to lo cals as well.43 While this sugg estion may be consistent with
the “spirit” of Berne, it may be too mu ch a stretch of t he text to make a persuasive case for
mandatory incorporation of Berne-TRIPs maxima into domestic member State law. Thus, at
least with respect t o domestic w orks, Be rne-TRIPs pro bably do not i mpair State s’
prerogatives to enforce contr acts en tered into b y their own a uthors t hat would r equire local
co-contractants t o refrai n from exploiting fa cts or i deas or fro m exercising q uotation
privileges. In so me St ates, s uch contracts may be un enforceable b ecause th ey violate local
public po licy, but suc h determinations fall outside th e Berne-TRIPs am bit. By contrast,
international nor ms come b ack into play , and m ight inv alidate s uch contracts, if t he r ight
holders were to seek enforcement of them against co-contractants from other jurisdictions.44
II. Failure of Private Ordering: Orphan Works
A. Nature of the problem
Normally, third-party exploitation of any of t he exclusive righ ts un der copyright
requires the copyright owner’s authorization, unless a copyright limitation or exception (such
as fair use) applies. Would-be exploiters who would not qualify for a limitation or exception
but who als o are unable to lo cate the copyright owner must decide whether to renounce their
projects or to in cur the risk th at the copy right o wner w ill reappear o nce the exploitation is
underway and de mand both injunctive and s ubstantial m onetary relief in an ensuing
infringement action. Potentially frustrated users range widely, from commercial entities who
seek to reissue out-of-print works or to create new works based on “orphan” works, to cultural
institutions -- nota bly museums and libraries -- that seek to digiti ze works for preservation
and educational purposes45 to individ uals who see k to incorporate an “or phan” work i n their
webpage or blog. The U.S . Register of Copyrights has deemed th e orphan works problem
“pervasive.”46
43

But se e, R icketson & Ginsburg, ¶ 6.11 1 (member States ma y accord loc al authors a le vel of protection
precluded by the Convention; article 19 would not permit foreign authors to claim that protection).
44
A rguably, w hen the ri ght h older see ks to en force a co ntract a gainst a f oreign co-c ontractant, the “country
where protection is sought” is the residence of the co-contractant. As a result, the right holder would no longer
be seeking protection in the country of origin, and article 5.3 would not apply. Rat her, the controversy would
unfold in an international context governed by Berne norms, including Berne “maxima.”
45
The E uropean en deavors c oncerning or phan w orks h ave t aken pla ce prima rily i n the context of the
Commission’s “ i2010 initiative” on d igital l ibraries. S ee Com munication “i2010: di gital libra ries” of 30
September 2005 , COM(2005) 46 5 fin al; Commission Recommendation of 24 Augu st 2006, on the digitization
and online accessibility of cultural material and digital preservation (2006/585/EC), OJEU L 236/28 (31.8.2006),
Recital 1
0;
Recommendation
6(a)(c), a
vailable at
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/digital_libraries/doc/recommendation/recommendation_august
06/en.pdf
46
See Statement of Mar ybeth Peters, Register of Co pyrights, before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, 110th Congress,
2nd Session, Marc h 13, 2 008, available a t http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html [h ereinafter
Statement o f Marybeth Peters]: “ In fac t, the mos t s triking a spect of orphan works i s t hat t he frustrations are
pervasive i n a way that many copyright problems are not. When a copyright ow ner cann ot b e identified or is
unlocatable, potential users abandon important, productive projects, many of which would be beneficial to our
national heritage. Scholars cannot use the important letters, images and manuscripts they search out in archives
or pri vate homes, ot her t han in the limited manner per mitted by fair use or t he first sale doc trine. P ublishers
cannot re circulate w orks or publish obscure m aterials tha t ha ve been a ll b ut lost t o the w orld. M useums ar e
stymied in their creation of exhibitions, books, websites and other educational programs, particularly when the
project wo uld inc lude t he use of multiple works. Archives cannot make rare footage av ailable to wi der
audiences. Do cumentary fi lmmakers mus.t exclude certain manuscripts, i mages, sound recordings a nd o ther
important source material from their films.”
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The intensity of the problem varies with the nature of the work. Chains of title may be
more rel iable and preval ent in some se ctors -- for examp le musical compositions an d
commercially published p rint works -- t han in others, particularly photographs.47 Moreover,
the number of unlocatable owners of currently unexploited works is likely to increase with the
expanded length of the copyright ter m,48 particularly if rightholders do not keep co pyright
management i nformation u p t o da te.49 The num ber of potentially unl ocatable rig htowners
may al so increase if the scop e of transfers of rights exclu des, or is am biguous r egarding,
different ty pes of exp loitations,50 partic ularly those enabled b y new technolog ies. If th e
author retai ned the righ ts to p articular kinds of exploitations or t o new media, then locating
the original publisher may not assist the w ould-be exploiter. If the publisher did not receive
(or no longer owns) the relevant rights, it cannot grant them to the would-be exploiter.51 If the
47

See, e.g., Agnieszka Vetulani, The Problem of Orphan Works in the EU: An overview of legislative solutions
and ma in actions i n this fie ld, report prepa red for Eur opean Commission D G Infor mation S ociety a nd Media
Unit E4: Digital Libraries and Public Sector Information, p. 7 (February 2008); Conseil Supérieur de la Propriété
Littéraire et Artistique, Commission sur les oeuvres orphelines, Rapport, pp. 12-14 (19 March 2008); Comments
of the American Society of Authors, Composers and Publishers Regarding Orphan Works, OW0628-ASCAP.pdf
(25 March 2005)(asserting no orphanage of non dramatic public performance rights in musical compositions);
College A rt Association, Comments on O rphan Works Notice of I nquiry, O W0647-CAA.pdf, pp. 7, 9-13 (25
March 2005) (emphasizing difficulty of identifying copyright owner of photographs).
48
The 1998 “Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act” increased the copyright term from life-plus-50 years
to li fe p lus 7 0 years for w orks created as of 1978, an d from 75 years from pub lication t o 95 y ears from
publication fo r wo rks published b efore 197 8 (and , wi th respect to wo rks published before 1964, wh ose fi rst
terms of copyright had been renewed). See 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304.
49
The rela xation of f ormalities t hat fo llowed e nactment of t he 1976 Copyright A ct a nd the 1988 Berne
Convention Implementation Act may also contribute to making it difficult to find the owner, as it is no longer
necessary to include a notice of c opyright on publicly-distributed copies, nor to re gister t he work with t he
Copyright Office (though registration remains a prerequisite to suit if the work is of U.S. origin, as well as to
certain remedies for all works) nor to renew the registration. See, e.g., Register of Copyrights, Report on Orphan
Works, 41-44 (2006) available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf [hereinafter Copyright
Office Report].
The ex tent to which t he red uction of formalities is i n fa ct a sign ificant cause of the or phan w orks
problem may, however, be open to q uestion. The copyright owner of a formalities-compliant work might still
prove unlocatable today because even mandatory copyright formalities did not require constant updating. Thus,
the i nformation identifying t he au thor or c opyright ow ner of a work pu blished w ith no tice in 1 930 w hose
registration was renewed in 1958 (and whose copyright will endure until 2025) will today be 50 years old. The
likelihood that th e information in th e 1958 renewal c ertificate remai ns accurate may not b e v ery high. Were
recordation of transfers m andatory, t hen that formality could ge nerate more use ful and reliable information
concerning right holders, but recordation is not now, and was not previously, a formality whose non-observance
resulted in loss of copyright protection.
50
One consequence of “divisible” copyright, introduced in the 1976 Copyright Act, is to proliferate the number
of potential rightholders, as “Any of the exclus.ive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of
any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by claus.e (1) and owned separately,.”
17 U .S.C. § 201( d)(2). S ee Jessica L itman, Sharing and Stealing, 26 COMM/ENT 1, 18–21 ( 2004):, “ largely
because of the adoption of divisibility of copyright, in many if not most cases, it can be difficult and sometimes
impossible to di scover w ho the copyright ow ners of a ll of t hose rights are.” In many European c ountries,
“divisible” copyright has long been the rule, see e.g., France Code of intellectual property, article L. 131-3. On
the relationship of multiple ownership of rights in works to the problem o f orphan works in the EU, see, e.g.,
Stef van Gompel, Unlocking the Potential of Pre-Existing Content: How to Address the Issue of Orphan Works
in Europe?, 38 IIC 669, 675-77 (2007).
A further complication, prevalent in Europe, arises from the changes in national borders throughout the
20th ce ntury. As a re sult of t he l ife-plus-70 term i n t he EU , a w ork f irst published in a n Eastern European
country in 1915, whose author di ed in 1950, will still be protected until 2020, but its country of origin may have
changed several times since its initial publication. See Vetulani, supra note 6, at 7.
51
Cf. Ran dom H ouse v. R osetta B ooks, 1 50 F.Supp.2d 613 (S DNY 200 1), aff’d., 283 F .3d 4 90 (2d Cir.
2002)(rejecting infringement claim by original publisher of paper-format books against publisher of eBooks to
whom the authors had granted their electronic rights).

13

authors (or their heirs), who are the residual right holders, cannot be found, then the would-be
exploiter is faced with the same quandary as outlined above.
The problem of identifying the rig ht owner, w hile perhaps exacerbated by the ag e of
the work, is not confin ed to older works; at least so me of th e pot entially “orphan ed” works
may be of re cent vin tage. Pictor ial and g raphic w orks, particu larly p hotographs and
illustrations in digital form, may be at risk of “imposed orphanage,” because third parties can
digitize the works without i dentifying information. And i f the works are al ready i n digital
form, th eir iden tifying information can b e rem oved and the work s re-ci rculated w ithout
apparent attribution. 52 A n orphan w orks regime must not o nly aim to make truly orphaned
works more widely available; it must also avoid the other extreme of th rusting “orphanage”
upon w orks w hose ri ght holders can in fact b e found. A rea sonably d iligent search for the
copyright owner(s) is the refore a n ecessary prer equisite to any re duction of th e exploiters’
risk.
B. Berne-TRIPs Constraints on Solutions to the Orphan Works Problem
The solution adopted must be consistent with international obligations under the Berne
Convention a nd the TRIPs Accord. For exam ple, orphan works legislation sh ould no t
occasion back door i mposition of f ormalities that condition the “enjo yment or ex ercise” of
copyright.53 O ne could imagine trying to solve the problem through a “two-tier” imposition
of for malities (or with other requirements inconsistent with internati onal nor ms) by li miting
the scheme to do mestic works. 54 In practice, h owever, this approach may n ot significantly
lessen exploiters’ burden, b ecause in many cases th ey would still have to spend resources to
determine whether or not the work was of local origin.
1.

Limitations on Works Included Within an Orphan Works Regime:
Unpublished Works

While unpu blished works may be likely candid ates for “orphan age,” they may al so
pose the gr eatest B erne-TRIPs difficulti es if in cluded w ithin the class of works subjec t to
State-ordered reduction of exclusiv e rights. Article 9.2 of the Berne Convention authorizes
member state s to provide exceptions and li mitations to the reprodu ction righ t “in certain
special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of
the work and does not u nreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”55 This
“three-step test” does not explicitly exclude unpublished works from the range of permissible
exceptions, but the “legitimate interests of the author” almost certainly include the int erest in
determining wh ether h er wo rk shall be publicl y disclose d. Be rne Convention ar ticle 10.1
supports this interpretation, because it limits the quotation right to “a work which has already

52

See, e.g., Brad Holland & Cynthia Turner, Comments on Orphan Works Notice of Inquiry, OW0660-HollandTurner.pdf (24 M arch 200 5); S tephen Morris, Professional Pht ographers of America, Co mments on Orphan
Works Notice of Inquiry, OW0642-PPA.pdf (25 March 2005).
53
See Berne Convention, article 5.2.
54
Id, article 5.3 (application of local law in country of origin). See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 411 (requiring copyright
registration of U.S. works as a prerequisite to initiation of an infringement action).
55
TRIPs article 13 generalizes the three-step test to all exclusive rights under copyright. However, TRIPs article
13 d oes n ot displace Berne article 11bis(2)'s mor e s pecific lim itations o n the ri ght of com munication to the
public. T hus, for example, me mber Sta tes ma y n ot, o utside the r ealm of "minor exceptions," cre ate
unremunerated exemptions for certain primary and secondary transmissions of works.
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difficult to i magine h ow the
been law fully made available to the publ ic.”56 It is
nonconsensual gen eral disclosure of a living au thor’s w ork w ould not “unreasonably
prejudice” her legitimate interest.
Nonetheless, it is not necessary to exclude all unpublished works (or all uses of them)
from an or phan w orks regi me b ecause not al l “unpub lished” works are und ivulged; for
example, pu blic p erformance is a divulgation, ev en if it is not a “publication” u nder U.S .
law.57 Moreover, the legitimate interests of deceased authors with respect to their undivulged
works may be relatively a ttenuated co mpared to th e pub lic be nefit t o be g ained fr om the
orphaned works’ post mortem disclosure. Similarly, these authors’ legitimate interests might
not be “unr easonably p rejudiced” w here the pu rpose of the us e is to digitize and preserv e
undisclosed works that exist only in a limited access archive. An orphan works regime which
covers all u ses of all u ndisclosed works, howev er, ri sks i ncompatibility with i nternational
norms.58
2. Limitations on the Scope of an Orphan Works Regime’s Incursions
into Exclusive Rights
Although Berne-TRIPs constr aints on the kinds of wo rks subject to an orphan works
regime may prove relatively minor, the in ternational treaties are lik ely to play an i mportant
role in shaping the extent to which the State may reduce the risk of would-be co-contractants
who, unable to find the copy right owners after a reasonably diligent sear ch, no netheless
exploit the works. Risk reduction could take the form of compulsory licensing, either de jure,
through State-administered rate-setting, or de facto, by limiting the re medies available to th e
reappearing copyright owner to damages for f uture as well as past exploitations. Moreover,
the State might seek to reassure would-be exploiters by limiting the amount of damages that
the reapp earing copy right owner could cla im. “Three-step te st” an alysis of diffe rent
limitations on remedies suggests that compulsory licenses for future us es once the copyright
owner has reappeared will b e prob lematic, bu t that S tates could limit damage awards to the
losses actually proved b y the copyright owner. There is no shortage of aca demic writing on
the three-step test,59 but yardstick used in this article is the analysis applied by the WTO Panel
in th e pro ceeding challenging section 11 0(5) of the
U.S. cop yright act ex empting
retransmissions of musical w orks in certain retail and r estaurant est ablishments fro m the
scope of the public p erformance right.60 The TR IPs Panel’s approach has been criticized as
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being too restrictive;61 nonetheless for our purposes the contours it articulates for exceptions
prove useful because an orphan works regime that meets the TRIPs Panel criteria will almost
certainly be compatible with international norms. This is not to say that bolder inroads would
fail to meet supranational stand ards, but rather that th e cautious ev aluation adop ted h ere
could, precisely because of its conservatism, outline a generally acceptable baseline.
a. The three-step test: Certain special cases
Both the ter ms “certai n” and “ special” require in terpretation. The WTO Panel
determined that “certain” m eant “clearly defined;” “spe cial” m eant “narrow in scope and
reach.”62 The Panel held t hese requir ements to be c umulative, and to a pply to the range of
works sub ject to th e ex ception, to the r ange o f beneficiaries of the exception, an d t o the
breadth of t he rights made subject to t he exception or li mitation.63 Thus, while th e scop e of
the 17 U.S .C. sec. 110(5)(B) excep tion was “clearly defined” with resp ect to the size of th e
business establishments benefiting from the exemption, it was not “narrow” because the class
of beneficiaries was held to be too broad, comprising most eating and drinking establishments
and al most half of
all ret ail es tablishments.64 By contrast, the secti on 110(5)(A)
("homestyle") exemption passed muster und er the first step because the nu mber of business
establishments a ffected, and the class of wo rks at i ssue -- dra matic musical works -- wa s
considerably smaller than those exempted by 110(5)(B).65
At first blush, an or phan work s regime th at reached all classes of w orks (excepting
perhaps undivulged works of living authors) and permitted all types of uses would appear too
broad to meet the first step. On th e other h and, the univ erse of works would n arrow w ith a
definition reaching only works whose right holders cannot be found despite a diligent search.
But there remain the questions whether the criteria necessary to a successful showing of due
diligence are suffic iently w ell-defined, and wheth er th ey suffici ently res trict the class of
relevant works. In other words, the lower the due diligence threshold, the greater the number
of works susceptible to “orphan” designation; this in turn risks crea ting a class of works that
is insufficiently narrow. By the same token, the wider the class of beneficiaries of the regime,
the less likely the “case” of orphan works is to be deemed “special.” Similarly, the greater the
range of exploitations the regime permits, the more likely the regi me may exceed the narrow
bounds of per missible “scope and r each.” Th is does not mean that no orphan works regi me
could pass the first step, but it does suggest that it will be very important to set a high standard
of due diligence in order to ensure that the “cases” in question are genuinely “special.”
b. Conflict with a “normal exploitation”
Arguably, l imiting r emedies for th e unauthorized use of “orphan” works poses no
Berne-TRIPs problem b ecause th ere is b y defini tion no “ normal exploitation” for a work
whose owner c annot b e fo und because i t cannot be e xploited. This conte ntion i s i ntuitively
appealing, but re quires closer analysis. As interpreted by the WTO panel, “ normal
exploitation” refers to uses that copyright owners in general would make of their work; it has
61
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not been applied to the use an individual copyright owner makes. Th us, for exam ple, th e
WTO Panel addressed “the ways that right holders normally extract economic value from that
right to t he work.” 66 The e xploitations that an orphan wor ks user would seek to make are
likely to be of the k ind that are norm ally lic ensed; ind eed the user has sought out the right
holder precisely because the use normally would require authorization.
But this in terpretation l eads to an i mpasse: b ecause the uses nor mally would requi re
authorization, th eir un authorized exercise w ould n ecessarily conflic t wi th a no rmal
exploitation. If the WT O Panel and co mmentators have focused on copy right owners in
general, rather than on the conduct of a more limited class of copyright owners, that may be
because the question has not been heretofore posed in those terms. If inquiry trains instead on
unlocatable copy right o wners, an exploitation which w ould be “normal” as to copyright
owners in g eneral might cease to be “normal” -- in the WTO Panel sense of extrac ting
economic value -- as to unlocatable owners because they have not b een extracting economic
value from the works . This, how ever, may prove to o much. An analysis th at d esignates an
exploitation “non-normal” if the particular copyright owner is not extracting economic value
from it could also d eprive locatable authors w ho decline to authorize certain uses of control
over such exploitations. Suppose, for example, that the author of a novel declined to authorize
a motion p icture versio n. Exercising fil m righ ts is a nor mal exploitation as to no velists in
general, but this novelist does not wish to avail herself of that right. Does that mean that, as to
this n ovelist, fil m rights are not a “nor mal exploitation,” and th at it would th erefore b e
permissible for a third party t o m ake an unauthorized motion picture base d on the nov el?
Such a conclusion would not be consonant with the Berne-TRIPs principle of exclusive rights.
Non-exploitation of rights by a particular rights holder thus may not suffice to remove
the desired use from the realm of “normal exploitations.” By contrast, it may be more fruitful
to consider the meaning of “conflict.” In the novelist example, a th ird party's exploitation of
film rights would “conflict” with th e nov elist's exclusive rig ht to make, or decli ne to make,
derivative works. In the o rphan works contex t, there may be no conflict w ith a no rmal
exploitation because th e right holder is neither exe rcising nor refusing t o exe rcise the
requested right. There is admittedly a conflict in the abstract, but in the case of an unlocatable
right hold er, it is not p ossible to k now wh ether or not th e owner would h ave granted or
refused a license. This analysis, howev er, is pr emised on accurate identification of the right
holder. Wh ere, for example, th e rights hav e reverted to the author (as is generally the cas e
with out-of-print works), but the user bases his orphan works claim on his inability to find the
publisher, th e un licensed use usur ps the author's right to d ecide wheth er or no t to allow th e
use.
If the notion of “conflict” provides the key to passing the second step, it would follow
that o nce a conflict a rises, that is, once the rig ht holder rea ppears and objects, an orphan
works regime that deprived the owner of the ability to enforce her copyright against ongoing
(as oppose d to past) uses wo uld be very p roblematic.67 To deny injunctive relief once the
copyright ow ner has reappeared is to create a c ompulsory license t hat ne ither the Berne
Convention nor the TRIPs Accord generally authorize. Some ongoing uses might nonetheless
be permissible: one might analogize to Berne Convention article 18.3, which permits member
states to “determine the conditions of application” of the principle of restoration of copyright
66
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in public domain works. This might suggest that some transitional measures to r econcile the
reliance interests of the diligently searching user with the exclusive rights of the reappearing
owner could be appropriate. For example, where the user, after diligent search, has gone on to
make a d erivative work base d on the orphan w ork, t hat additional a uthorship may justify
requiring the user and the owner to come to an agreement.68
c. Unreasonably prejudice
If the ex ception do es not “c onflict w ith a nor mal exploitation,” then, u nder the third
step, the exception may be permissible so long as it does not unreasonably harm right holder
interests that ar e justif iable in light of gener al copyright objectives; th e unreasonableness of
the harm may in some cases be allayed if the state substitutes compensation for the control the
copyright owner could have exercised absent the exception. The right holder interests are the
usual ones, although one might contend that a right holder who has "effecti vely abandoned"
the work has disclai med any interest; and, h aving given up any interest in the work, she has
none left to be "unreasonably prejudiced." This may be too facile a characterization, however,
for it assumes deliberate no n-exploitation o f the wo rk. That may be true for so me right
holders, but not for others, particularly residual right holders (authors) who may be unaware
that they retain the relevant rights or have reacquired them by reversion.
Another app roach to interpreting th e legitimacy of the right hold er’s interests would
take account of t he nature of the use sought to be made. For example, the legiti macy of the
unlocatable right h older's de facto r efusal to license may be less persu asive where the user
wishes to undertake a non-prof it edu cational or librar y use . This a pproach may be
problematic, however: the purpose of an “orph an works” regime is t o allow uses that would
(or might) not otherwise qualify as exem pted fair uses. If th e use is more extensive than fair
use would gen erally allow, t hen a refusal to license w ould be a le gitimate w ay t o enforc e
exclusive rights. On the other hand, as the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated, while “fair use”
is non-infrin ging use, and therefore lea ves th e copyright ow ner remediless, injunctive relief
may not al ways be the sole means of protecting the author's legitimate interests, particularly
when the user has made certain transformative uses of the work.69
The key in quiry in th e case o f orphan works may focus on the “unreasonab ly
prejudice” co mponent of the third step. Th e WTO Panel stated, “pr ejudice to th e l egitimate
interests of right holders reaches an unreasonable level if an exception or limitation causes or
has the potential to cause a n unreasonable loss of income to the copyright owner.”70 At the
time the diligent user exploits the work after unsuccessfully searching for the right ow ner, an
unauthorized use w ould not "cause a n unreason able l oss of inc ome to [a] copy right owner"
who has not b een deriving any i ncome fro m th e w ork. But futur e losses must also be
considered. The Panel further stated:
6.247 We recall our conclusion that in the application of the three conditions of Article
13 to an exemption in national law, both actual and potential effects of that exception
are relevant. A s regards th e third condition in particular, we note th at if onl y actual
losses were taken into account, it might be possible to justify the introduction of a new
exception to an exclusive right irrespective of its scope in situations where the right in
68
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question was newly int roduced, rig ht holders did not previ ously have e ffective or
affordable means of enforcing that right, or th at right was not exercised becaus.e the
right holders had not yet built the necessary collective management structure required
for such exerci se. W hile under such circumstances t he in troduction o f a new
exception might not cause immediate additional loss of income to t he right holder, he
or she could never build up expectations to earn income from the exercise of the right
in question. We believe that such a n interpretation, if it be came th e nor m, co uld
undermine the scop e and binding effect of the minimum st andards of intellect ual
property rights protection embodied in the TRIPS Agreement.
In the context of "orphaned" works, this statement cautions us to ensure that, should
the right holder reappear, she be able to exercise her rights not only against any exploitations
by the dili gent us er (as well as by the wo rld at large) subse quent to the righ t h older’s
reappearance, but also with re spect t o the d iligent us er's previously un dertaken yet ongoing
exploitations. To leav e the right h older re mediless ag ainst ongoing uses may significa ntly
compromise the righ t holder's ability to a uthorize others to explo it the rights in q uestion,
particularly b y means of "exclusive" lice nses. Non-co mmercial ong oing use s may less
severely prejudice the reappearing right holder's l egitimate i nterests, b ut such categorical
distinctions may not always be possible to make. A non-commercial use, particularly on th e
Internet, may supplant a licensed use as much as a commercial one would.
Compensation, whether in the form of a negotiated agreement (with po tential judicial
intervention), damage awards, escrow payments, or a more formally administered compulsory
license, might diminish the prejudice to the reappearing owner. But, as a long-term remedy,
compensation may not be a ppropriate, because t he reapp earing owner will, as a practi cal
matter, thenceforth be unable to license exclusive rights. Some combination of compensation
and cut -off dates m ay respond more effectively to th e need to protect the reappearin g
copyright owner agai nst un reasonable prejudice. A grace period durin g which th e diligently
searching us er may continue to exp loit the work may preve nt th e prejudice fro m b ecoming
"unreasonable," so l ong a s the ri ght hold er retri eves fu ll rights, incl uding against the user
thereafter.
3. Limitations on Monetary Awards
If Berne-TRIPs no rms bar member States fro m deny ing injunctive relief – be yond a
reasonable grace period – even with respect to a carefully and narrowly circumscribed class of
works whose right ho lders re main unlocatable despite a s ufficiently diligent s earch, might
member St ates enjoy greater fle xibility with respect to monetary relief? If the pro spect of
large damage awards to reapp earing ri ght ho lders d eters exploitation o f orphan works,
perhaps member S tates might di minish explo iters’ e xposure by ca pping da mages at so me
nominal su m71 or o therwise li miting monetary awards. Th e foll owing an alysis wi ll show ,
however, that Berne nor ms i mplicitly, and TRIPs st andards e xplicitly, require that m ember
States provide for recovery of damages corresponding to the actual harm the r ight holder has
incurred. As a result, while member States may preclude monetary awards in excess of those
losses, they may not impose a lower ceiling on damages.
a. Damage awards under Berne
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The Berne C onvention l eaves r emedies t o member countries,72 although the
Convention’s rest rictions on t he imposition of compulsory l icenses73 sug gest th at member
States are expected to ma ke injunctive relief available in most cases. By contrast, nothing in
the Berne text addresses t he scop e of m onetary relief, altho ugh one might contend that the
Convention assumes member States will at least award damages adequate to co mpensate for
the injury resulti ng from infringem ent of the copyright. Ty pically, the p laintiff must prove
losses att ributable to the infringe ment. In the context of orphan works, w hat would thes e
damages be? Because the reappearing right holder has not been exploiting the work, there are
no lost sales to po int to. But a cour t might calculate the licensing fee the right holder cou ld
reasonably h ave demanded, gi ven t he na ture of t he work a nd o f the exploitation, h ad t he
exploiter been able to negotiate ex ante with the right holder. For exa mple, the orphan works
bills proposed in the U. S. Congress in 2008 wo uld hav e limited the exploiter’s exposu re to
monetary relief to “reaso nable co mpensation,” defined as “t he amount” a will ing b uyer and
seller w ould have agreed “with resp ect to the infringing u se i mmediately before th e
infringement began.”74
The defendant’s profits may be another measure of damages; where profits “are taken
into account in co mputing the actual damages,”75 for exa mple in calculating the percentageof-profits royalty the d efendant wo uld h ave o wed t o the copyright owner had t he use be en
licensed, pr ofits should be considered within the real m o f ac tual da mages, and therefore
within the minimum remedies available to the copyright owner. By contrast, where a member
State’s law provides for p rofits “attributable to the infri ngement” over and above the profits
calculated w ithin act ual d amages,76 t hese may be considered a k
ind of additi onal
“disgorgement” remedy di stinct from compensating th e copyright o wner fo r it s lo sses. As
such, they might ex ceed the minimum r emedies i mplicit in the Bern e Conven tion, and t heir
exclusion from the remedies available to copyright owners of orphan w orks may not vio late
Berne norms.77
b. Damage awards under TRIPs
Unlike the Berne Conv ention, th e TRIPs ac cord sets out minimum standards for
remedies for violations of int ellectual pr operty ri ghts. A rticle 45 addresses damages.78
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Article 45.1 requir es payment of “damages ad equate to co mpensate for th e in jury the right
holder has suffered because of an infringement” when the infringer knows or should know he
or she i s infringing. TRI Ps thus makes explicit the implied Berne requirement that member
States must at l east en sure th at defendants c ompensate copyright h olders for th e losses
sustained from acts of infringement.
Article 4 5.2 address es u nknowing infringement, and permits member States to
“authorize the judicial authoriti es to order recovery of profits and/or pay ment o f preestablished damages.” This language leaves open the question whether the damages required
by arti cle 45.1 i mplicitly i nclude profits. Article 45’s failure to speci fy profits in the
mandatory scope of recov ery for willful infringement, while allowin g (without requiring)
them in the case of innocent infringement should probably be understood to mean that profits
may be allowed as compensation for both willful and innocent infringement, but are required
for neith er. A rguably, because th e st ructure of t he article suggests that th e mandatory
monetary recovery for innocent infringement should be less than for knowing infringement, it
could follow that, with respect to knowing infringement, profits are implicitly included within
the mandatory scope. This r eading i s non etheless im probable because article 45.2 also
includes “p re-established da mages” w ithin the pe rmissible sc ope of re medies available
against innocent infringers, but “pre-established damages,” such as the U.S. Copyright Act’s
statutory damages,79 are relatively uncommon, and therefore are unlikely to be the object of a
mandatory international norm.
Conclusion
This exploration of the extremes of th e copyright-contract s pectrum f inds little
prescriptive force in the Berne-TRIPs “maxima” with respect to private agreements to protect
subject matter th e treaties e xclude fro m copyright’s ambit. By con trast, B erne-TRIPs
“minima” can meaningfully constrain a S tate’s prerogative to i mpose compulsory licenses or
limit remedies when private agreements cannot be concluded, for example because a willing
buyer canno t fi nd t he selle r (w illing or otherw ise). Th e minima sho uld not, ho wever, be
regarded as an impediment to resolving the “orphan works” problem. Rather, attention to the
minima sho uld en able S tates to shap e an orphan works regim e wh ich both per mits th e
exploitation of unlocatable righ t h olders’ w orks, and fa irly compensates t hose right holders
who, notwithstanding a rigorously diligent but unsuccessful search, subsequently turn up and
object to the uses made of their works.

authorize the judicial authorities to order recovery of profits and/or payment of pre-established damages
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activity.
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